An ethical conflict arises when we must perform research in the interest of future patients, but that this may occasionally injure the interests of today''s patients. In the case of cognitively impaired persons, the question arises whether it is compatible with humane healthcare not only to treat, but also to use these patients for research purposes. Some bioethicists and theologians have formulated a general duty of solidarity, also pertaining to cognitively impaired persons, as a justification for research on these persons. (...) If one examines this thesis from the theory of justice according to John Rawls, it is revealed that such a duty of solidarity cannot necessarily be extrapolated from Rawls' conception of justice. This is at least true of Rawls' difference principle, because accordingto the difference principle only those measures are justifiable which serve the interest of the respective least well off. Those measures which would engender additional injury for the least well off could not be balanced by any utility according to Rawls. However, John Rawls' difference principle is subordinate to the first principle, which is that each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with the same liberty for others. These primary goods are determined by the freedom and integrity of the person. This integrity of decisionally impaired persons would be in danger if one would abstain from research and thus forego the increase in knowledge related to their disease. Thus one could conclude, at least from Rawls' first principle, that society must take on a duty to guarantee the degrees of freedom for cognitively impaired persons and thus also support the efforts for their healing. (shrink)

• Answer ONE question from Section B. • Answer ONE question from Section C. 3. WRITE ANSWERS FROM EACH SECTION IN A DIFFERENT ANSWER BOOK.

Science is not taken for granted any longer. Society, politics and the media pose critical questions tending to censorship or at least control of science. How does science respond? It cannot exist and develop without freedom, but this does not mean freedom to amass knowledge and apply technological applications at any price and without restrictions. Science should be autonomous, but is not value-free. A distintion is made between external and internal social/ethical problems. The former refer to questions of the social/ethical (...) context and consequences of scientific research, and the latter to the rules of ‘good practice’ and scientific integrity. The role of academies of science, and of associations of such academies (e.g. All European Academies (ALLEA)) in developing codes of good scientific practice and fostering a proper sense of scientific values and standards is further discussed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 29, Number 1, April 2003, pp. 125-141 Dr. George Cheyne, Chevalier Ramsay, and Hume's Letter to a Physician JOHN P. WRIGHT The publication of a new intellectual biography of George Cheyne1 provides a "propitious" occasion for "a thoroughly skeptical review"2 of the question which has long exercised Hume scholars, whether Cheyne was the intended recipient of David Hume's fascinating pie-Treatise Letter to a Physician,3 the letter (...) which describes his own hypochondriacal physical and mental symptoms and gives an account of his early philosophical development.4 Hume's nineteenth-century biographer, John Hill Burton, argued that Hume was probably writing to Cheyne,5 while Ernest Mossner claimed to definitively refute that hypothesis in an article entitled "Hume's Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot," published in 1944.6 Anita Guerrini's intellectual biography does not discuss Cheyne as a possible recipient of Hume's letter, but she does present a well-rounded picture of this interesting eighteenth-century physician from which we can judge his appropriateness as its addressee. In the following discussion I will make use of the biographical material found in this new biography of Cheyne, as well as other sources, to show that Mossner's arguments are less than definitive, and that it would be wrong to dismiss the possibility that the letter was sent to George Cheyne.7 This is a possibility that, for reasons that I will make clear, makes good biographical and philosophical sense. At the same time, it is important to keep a proper suspense of judgment as Burton did, for the evidence that the letter was either intended for or actually sent to Cheyne is not definitive. John P. Wright is Professor of Philosophy, Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant, MI 48859, USA. e-mail: [email protected] 126 John P. Wright Burton, who first published the autobiographical letter of the 22-yearold Hume in 1846, narrowed down the possible addressees of Hume's letter to either Cheyne or John Arbuthnot. He also pointed out that it is possible that the letter was never sent, and that the ten and a half page manuscript is only a neatly written draft, rather than a fair copy of an actual letter. Nevertheless, Burton thought he could identify the unnamed addressee on the basis of the internal evidence of the manuscript and the records of Scottish physicians practicing in England at the time. In the letter, Hume refers to the intended recipient as his "Countryman, a Scotchman [,]... a skilful Physician, a man of Letters, of Wit, of Good Sense, & of great Humanity."8 Further he writes that he is consulting him because he is a person "of great Learning beyond [his]... own Profession" who is acquainted with the "Motions of the Mind" he has described in his letter, and that "Fame pointed [him]... out as the properest person to resolve my Doubts..." about the cure of his disorder.9 Burton tells us that "the first name that suggested itself... was Arbuthnot, whose fine genius was just then flickering in the socket."10 (John Arbuthnot had been ill for some time, and died a year later.) But he then added that "a more full consideration showed to my satisfaction that it must have been destined for Dr. George Cheyne." His main reason for settling on Cheyne was that Cheyne's immensely popular The English Malady (1733) had recently been published, and that "there is a certain unison of tone between Hume's letter and this book." Burton quotes a portion of Cheyne's own long autobiographical account of his own disease in The English Malady. Cheyne's autobiography begins with the claim that "I passed my Youth in close study, and almost constant Application to the abstracted Sciences, (wherein my chief pleasure consisted) and consequently in great Temperance and a Sedentary Life"; it is followed by the reflection that any overindulgence in food or drink led to physical and psychological problems.11 He goes on to describe these in great detail for 39 pages, along with a history of his life. Burton also quotes a section of the book in which Cheyne describes how a studious and sedentary life causes the symptoms... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NEWMAN'S PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCOVERY: THE ILLATIVE SENSE (Continued) VI THE FACULTIES OF COGNITION AND APPETITION Since the Grammar of Assent gives us a phenorhenological analysis of the art of thinking and often refers to the influence of other faculties in our reasoning processes, it will be very instructive to examine what the author holds about our faculties of cognition and appetition. This will make us better acquainted with the nature (...) of the illative sense. I. THE SENSES 1. The External Senses and their Objects. We had already arrived at the conclusion that Newman rejects the mere subjectivity of our knowledge. When he writes about this matter he explicitly deals with sensation or sensuous cognition. Although he takes exception to the word "immediate perception," 1 we may nevertheless call him an adherent of direct or immediate realism according to Scholastic terminology, because he emphatically excludes the intervention of a reasoning process from sense perception and uses the term "mediate perception" only to express the instrumentality of experience. In this meaning our perception of external objects is mediate or indirect indeed.2 The fact is that as early as 1839 he wrote in his University Sermons: "Of the material we have direct knowledge through the senses"3 and in 1843: "The senses are direct, immediate, and ordinary informants, and act spontaneously without any will or effort on our part."4 On the importance of sense perception for our mental activities he writes in a series of hitherto unpublished notes, entitled Elements of Thought:6 "I grant or I assume that the soul would not think without some external stimulus; that if it were cut off from all communication from the external world, it would pass this life in a sort of torpor... But then, as soon as it is roused, it reflects upon itself, and thereby gains a number of ideas..." 1. See supra V, 14.2. Supra V, 14.3. P. 205. 4.P. 303 ; cf. Gramm., p. 260. 5.See the unpublished Philosophical Papers, note Fcbr. 24, 1859. 40 DR. ZENO, OJM. CAP.41 Apart from the passages already referred to, Newman nowhere enlarges on the doctrine about the senses. He does not speak about the distinctions between sensible objects; he does not explain the difference between sensation and perception, and uses those terms promiscuously.6 There are no statements on the subject which contradict current Scholastic notions, although sometimes his vague terminology may be an occasion for misunderstandings. For instance, some passages in connection with "images" and "impressions," when read apart from the context, would appear to imply that he identifies them with the Scholastic species a sensibili accepta. However, we shall show further on that. Newman means something quite different. He deals with these species and the so-called sensibilia per acci· dens by the way when describing our knowledge of God7 and teaching that we have evidence of the presence of individuals or substances in the phenomena which occur to our senses. We picture those things to ourselves in those phenomena. They are like pictures, he says, but at the same time "they give us no exact measure or character of the unknown things beyond them." "Therefore when we speak of our having a picture of the things which are perceived through the senses, we mean a certain representation, true as far as it goes, but not adequate." 2. The Internal Senses and their Objects. Newman nowhere gives a distinction between external and internal senses, but nevertheless he speaks about those faculties of the mind which by the Scholastics are called the internal senses. These philosophers distinguish a common sense or rather a central sense (sensus communis), which unites the impressions of the external senses into one whole, makes us conscious of the conditions of our body and notifies to us the sensations of our external as well as internal senses; — the imagination or the faculty which preserves and reproduces things perceived; — the sensuous memory, i. e., the power to retain and to reproduce sense images; — and the vis aestimativa or the instinctive faculty, which discovers without any intellectual means, what is good and what is bad for our welfare. 6.It would seem that he generally... (shrink)

Book list for independent research component Aizenman, J., and Pinto, B. (eds.), Managing Economic Volatility and Crises: A Practitioner’s Guide. Cambridge U.P. 978-0521855242..

Francis W. Peabody, MDDepartment of MedicineBoston City Hospital and Harvard Medical SchoolBoston, MassachusettsMarch 19, 2017Dear Dr. Peabody,Thank you for giving us the opportunity to review your manuscript "The Care of the Patient." It has been carefully considered by the editors and two external reviewers. We regret to inform you that it cannot be considered further for publication in the Prestigious Journal of Medicine.Chief among our reasons is that it is overly long. Opinion pieces—especially non-data driven articles about topics like ethics—should (...) be no longer than 1,000 words. Compounding matters, the lack of graphics or tables makes the paper difficult to digest efficiently. We also agree with the... (shrink)

Bhattacharyya, K. The Advaita concept of subjectivity.--Deutsch, E. Reflections on some aspects of the theory of rasa.--Nakamura, H. The dawn of modern thought in the East.--Organ, T. Causality, Indian and Greek.--Chatterjee, M. On types of classification.--Lacombe, O. Transcendental imagination.--Bahm, A. J. Standards for comparative philosophy.--Herring, H. Appearance, its significance and meaning in the history of philosophy.--Chang Chung-yuan. Pre-rational harmony in Heidegger's essential thinking and Chʼan thought.--Staal, J. F. Making sense of the Buddhist tetralemma.--Enomiya-Lassalle, H. M. The mysticism of Carl Albrecht (...) and Zen.--Parrinder, G. The nature of mysticism.--Cairns, G. E. Axiological contributions of East and West to the spiritual development of mankind.--Mayeda, S. Śaṇkara's view of ethics.--Mercier, A. On peace.--Barlingay, S. S. A discussion of some aspects of Gaudapāda's philosophy. (shrink)

Philosophy in Africa has for more than a decade now been dominated by the discussion of one compound question, namely, is there an African philosophy, and if there is, what is it? The first part of the question has generally been unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative. Dispute has been primarily over the second part of the question as various specimens of African philosophy presented do not seem to pass muster. Those of us who refuse to accept certain specimens as philosophy (...) have generally been rather illogically said also to deny an affirmative answer to the first part of the question. In a paper presented at the International Symposium in Memory of Dr William Amo, the Ghanaian philosopher who taught in German universities in the early part of the eighteenth century, Professor Odera Oruka identified four trends, perhaps more appropriately approaches, in current African philosophy. (shrink)